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While the merits of collegiality are often invoked, it is not a per-
fectly clear term. Collegiality has been defined as "a form of social
organization based on shared and equal participation of all its mem-
bers. It contrasts with a hierarchical, pyramidal structure. .. ." By
this definition, it is merely an organizational form, such as the Su-
preme Court, but takes no note of interactions among the members
of that structure. The more common understanding, though, con-
siders the relationships among the members of the collegial body.
Villanova University, for example, has declared: "Collegiality entails
mutual understanding, respect, and trust among all these groups,
based upon their shared sense that it is in the common interest of all
to cooperate in promoting the general welfare and the mission of the
academic community."2 In this vision, collegiality involves people co-
operating in the interest of some greater group interest, rather than
pursuing their self-interest.
Academics typically put great importance on this sense of collegi-
ality. In hiring decisions, we commonly evaluate whether an individ-
ual would make "a good colleague." In research, collaboration is
common in order to take advantage of varied strengths and diverse
insights. All this presumes that group production of a good is prefer-
able to atomistic individual production. At least one study has con-
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firmed this presumption, finding that academic nurses operating in
collegial environments were more productive in research.3
In the context of the judiciary, Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C.
Circuit has suggested that collegiality is the manner in which "appel-
late judges overcome their individual predilections in decision mak-
ing.''4 He criticized those who would capture judicial decision mak-
ing solely through ideology, contending that they ignored this
collegiality effect and its moderation of individuals' ideological pref-
erences. For Judge Edwards, collegiality means "that judges have a
common interest, as members of the judiciary, in getting the law
right, and that, as a result, we are willing to listen, persuade, and be
persuaded, all in an atmosphere of civility and respect."5 It is borne
of "(a) experiences of duty and professional obligation, (b) under-
standings of shared purpose, (c) concerns about the maintenance of
corporate authority or legitimacy, and (d) participation in a rou-
tine-each of which suggest the presence of a kind of motivation
[that is] something other than rational, self-interested, strategic, and
calculating., 6 In this view, collegiality is juxtaposed against ideology
or strategy as a decision-making influence.
Judge Frank Coffin of the First Circuit takes a very similar ap-
proach to collegiality, describing it as judges working closely together
with "respect for the strengths of the others," with restraint on "one's
pride of authorship," with value placed on "understanding and com-
promise," and with engagement in the pursuit of "excellence in the
court's decision."' For Judge Coffin, collegiality requires open-
minded responsiveness to the opinions of panel colleagues. It may be
chilled by comments such as, "Nothing's going to change my mind.,
8
In the Edwards/Coffin conceptualization, collegiality is a rather
"warm and fuzzy" concept of sensitive, collaborative production
aimed at optimizing the result.
Much of the existing discussion of collegial courts has involved the
circuit courts, and the Supreme Court may not be the situs of much
3 See Virginia Henderson International Nursing Library, The Effects of Collegiality and Col-
legial Networks on Research Productivity, http://nursinglibrary.org/Portal/main.aspx?
pageid=4024&sid=1014 (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
4 Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1639, 1639 (2003).
5 Id. at 1645 (footnote omitted).
6 Howard Gillman, The New Institutionalism: More and Less than Strategy: Some Advantages to
Interpretive Institutionalism in the Analysis of Judicial Politics (pt. 1), LAW & CrS. (Law &
Courts Section of the Am. Political Sci. Ass'n, Newark, Del.), Winter 1996-1997, at 6, 8.
7 FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, ANDJUDGING 215 (1994).
8 Id. at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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collegiality of this type. Oliver Wendell Holmes described the Court
as "nine scorpions in a bottle."9 The Court has surely seen interper-
sonal conflict over the years, and disagreement is frequent. The Ed-
wards/Coffin collegiality process, though, operates to some degree.
After a majority opinion author is assigned, he or she circulates a
draft opinion, after which other members of the Court circulate bar-
gaining statements, agreeing to join the opinion if certain changes
are made.'0 Subsequently, a Justice may circulate a dissenting or con-
curring opinion in hopes of persuading other members of the Court,
or affecting the content of the majority opinion, and this action is not
infrequently successful."
Some features of the Supreme Court could encourage greater col-
legiality among the Justices than the level found in circuit courts. All
the Justices sit together for each case, unlike circuit courts where
panels vary widely. They all deliberate over the same cases, which
they themselves have selected on certiorari. There is necessarily some
collegial interaction on the Supreme Court, as "the justices are
locked into intricate webs of interdependence where the impulse to
speak in a personal voice must always be balanced against the need to
act collectively in order to be effective.'
12
Jan Crawford Greenburg's recent book on the Court reports that
Justice O'Connor was put off in her first Term by Justice Brennan,
but later unsettled by Justice Thomas. 3 By contrast, O'Connor felt
some affinity for and was influenced by Justice Marshall. 4 Greenburg
9 Richard A. Posner, A Tribute to Justice William J Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13-14
(1990) (attributing this phrase to justice Holmes).
10 These may be quite collegial and accommodating. In one conference memorandum,
ChiefJustice Rehnquist wrote:
I prefer the position taken in the most recent circulation of my proposed opinion
for the Court, but want very much to avoid a fractionated Court on this
point.... If a majority prefers Nino's view, I will adopt it; if I can get a majority for
the view contained in the present draft, I will adhere to that. If there is some
.middle ground" that will attract a majority, I will even adopt that.
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES 21 (1996) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
11 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN &JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICESJUSTICES MAKE 78 (1998) (reporting
that these types of opinions influenced a quarter of the landmark decisions they exam-
ined).
12 Linda Greenhouse, The Court: Same Time Next Year. And Next Year, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2002, at C3.
13 SeeJAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE
FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 82-83, 122-23 (2007) (detailing
the harsh rebukes that Justice Brennan directed at Justice O'Connor early in her Su-
preme Court career, and the ideological distance she felt from Justice Thomas).
14 Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1217, 1217-20 (1992).
Jan. 2008]
JOURNAL OF CONSTFUTIONAL LAW
reports more collegial relationships among other Justices, such as
Breyer and Kennedy,15 and Thomas reportedly influenced the deci-
sions of Scalia. 16 Jeffrey Rosen reported thatJustice Breyer could per-
suadejustice O'Connor through collegial discussion.
7
Tools are available to analyze the possible collegiality effects of
Supreme Court Justices. Lee Epstein and others have examined the
change, over time, in voting patterns of Supreme Court Justices, us-
ing Martin-Quinn scores. They demonstrate that the voting patterns
of Justices have changed over time, some quite significantly. Some
Justices have become more liberal (Blackmun, Souter, Stevens), while
others have become more conservative in their voting patterns
(Black, Frankfurter, White).is
While there are a variety of reasons why a Justice's personal ideo-
logical preferences may change, one explanation would be the com-
position of the Justice's colleagues. Thus, a persuasive and collegial
Justice, as Brennan was reputed to be, might exert a certain centripe-
tal pull on the other Justices. A more antagonistic Justice might have
the opposite effect. This effect might be tested. The Epstein et al.
research on voting patterns is consistent with Greenburg's theory that
Justice Thomas pushed Justice O'Connor away-her leftwards turn
dates from about the time that he joined the Court. 9 Justice Ken-
nedy, by contrast, did not become more liberal after this time.0
Thus, research on voting patterns may reveal collegiality effects. The
data regarding change in voting patterns over time also considered
only the direction of the vote, and evidence of collegiality (or lack
thereof) could be found in the willingness to issue separate opinions,
such as concurrences, even in the event of outcome agreement.
Another possible tool for measuring collegial interaction on the
Court would be the examination of voting fluidity, i.e., instances
where a Justice changed his or her mind over the course of Court de-
liberation. While there is no universal record of such fluidity at the
Court, there are conference notes of retired Justices that record the
15 See GREENBURG, supra note 13, at 174 (noting that Breyer and Kennedy "liked to talk
things out").
16 Id. at 117, 124-25.
17 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT DEFINED
AMERICA 200 (2007).
18 Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drif Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Impor-
tan?, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007).
19 See id. at 1506-07 fig.6 (illustrating that O'Connor was more liberal in 1991 and beyond
than in all her previous years on the Court).




changes for some past time periods. Justice Burton's notes revealed
that twelve percent of the votes changed between conference and the
final decision.2 1 Some very important decisions can be explained by
post-conference vote changes. Perhaps this is evidence of collegial
persuasion at the Court.
The nature of voting fluidity has been empirically analyzed. The
conventional vision of collegiality would have judges drawn away from
their ideologies with persuasive legal arguments. Thus, there is a
story of Justice Brennan telling Justice Stewart, "I voted the other way
at conference but you've convinced me.''23  Walter Murphy pro-
claimed that "intellectual persuasion can play an important role" in
getting Justices to shift their positions.24 While this story is consistent
with the Edwards/Coffin theory of collegiality, the research shows
that the degree of ideological voting did not decline significantly be-
25tween the time of the initial and final vote on the merits. WhenJus-
tices do shift, it is generally to a position that is ideologically proxi-
26mate. Most of the switching that occurs is by ajustice in a minority
position at conference, who changes to join the majority.2 This has
been called conformity voting, and it was more likely to occur in rela-
21 Saul Brenner, Fluidity on the United States Supreme Court: A Reexamination, 24 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 526, 528 (1980). The Warren Court saw a similar rate of votes that changed between
conference and the final decision, thirteen percent. Saul Brenner, Research Update, Flu-
idity on the Supreme Court: 1956-1967, 26 AM.J. POL. SCI. 388, 388 (1982).
22 See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 178-225, 244 (identifying Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in this group).
23 Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on
the Burger Court, 90 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 581, 581 (1996) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
24 WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OFJUDICIAL STRATEGY 44 (1964).
25 See Saul Brenner, Research Note, Ideological Voting on the Vinson Court: A Comparison of
Original &Final Votes on the Merits, 22 POLITY 157, 164 (1989) ("[T]he final vote was less
ideological than the original vote, but the differences between the votes was not substan-
tial .... ").
26 See Timothy M. Hagle & Harold J. Spaeth, Voting Fluidity and the Attitudinal Model of Su-
preme Court Decision Making, 44 W. POL. Q. 119, 122 (1991) (finding that Warren Court
Justices who switched to the minority were ideologically closer to the dissenting Justices
over seventy percent of the time).
27 See Robert H. Dorff & Saul Brenner, Conformity Voting on the United States Supreme Court, 54
J. POL. 762, 764 (1992) ("Justices... are 12.1 times more likely to switch in the direction
of conformity (minority-majority) than in the direction of counterconformity (majority-
minority)."). This tendency could be explained by the added costs of writing a dissenting
opinion or a "bandwagon" psychological effect at the Court. See Frank B. Cross, The Jus-
tices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 556 (1998) [hereinafter Cross, Justices] (reviewing LEE
EPSTEIN &JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICESJUSTICES MAKE (1998)).
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tively less significant cases.2 s A more sophisticated multivariate study
found that a variety of features appeared to explain voting fluidity.
Central to these features was ideological closeness to the author of
the opinion joined in the switch, and other factors, including the
complexity of the case and the conformity voting tendency. The au-
thors concluded that voting fluidity could be attributed to "policy
preferences and their strategic calculations. '" ' This evidence does
not provide much support for the Edwards/Coffin collegial reason-
ing theory's operation at the Supreme Court level.
The papers at the Symposium do not employ the Edwards/Coffin
"warm and fuzzy" notion of collegiality. Instead, they adopt a more
hardheaded rational choice model of the Court's functioning. The
Articles do analyze collegiality in its broader definition, simply involv-
ing the interaction of (rough) equals in decision making. To the ex-
tent that they accurately describe reality, they call into at least some
question the descriptive reality of the Edwards/Coffin conceptualiza-
tion.
The claim of Staudt, Friedman, and Epstein-that homogeneous
coalitions yield more dramatic legal outcomes-is a very plausible
one and supported by their empirical evidence. Given the well-
known influence of ideological predispositions on the votes of the
Justices,"1 one would expect this tendency to carry over into their
opinions. If so, the ideological makeup of the opinion's coalition
would be salient. Presumably, the motive for ideological voting is to
create an ideologically desired "law of the land." It is therefore quite
plausible that more ideologically consistent coalitions would produce
more ideological opinions that, in turn, are more significant, as meas-
ured by their press coverage scale. A more heterogeneous majority
coalition would be expected to require more compromise, compel-
28 See Dorff & Brenner, supra note 27, at 772 (reporting that increased saliency reduces by
68% the likelihood of a conformity switch).
29 See Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 23, at 588-89 (describing the effect of different
variables on the probability of vote changes).
30 Id. at 591.
31 See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
A'TITUDINAL MODEL REVISTED 357 (2002) (contending that the votes of Justices are
driven by ideologies). Ideology appears to better explain voting patterns than any other
dimension. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Patterns of Supreme Court Decision-
Making, 1937-2000 1 (Ctr. for Statistics & the Soc. Scis., Univ. of Wash., Working Paper
No. 26, 2002), available at http://www.csss.washington.edu/Papers/wp26.pdf (describing
a statistical model, based on the "preferred policy position (or ideal point) of each jus-
tice," that correctly classifies prior Court votes over 75% of the time).
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ling a more minimalist decision, which is of less obvious political sali-
ence.
The implications of these findings are quite murky. Although the
authors suggest that more ideological coalitions are the source of
more significant rulings, the directionality of the relationship is un-
clear. It is distinctly possible that ideologically salient cases, of the
sort that create rulings warranting press coverage, are precisely the
sort of cases that induce ideologically homogeneous alignments of
Justices. News coverage is generally not triggered by legal break-
throughs so much as by political salience. To the extent this is true,
the independent and dependent variables are simply measuring the
same thing, the ideological component of the opinion.
Another related possibility is that news coverage is cued by the
ideological alignment of the decision. When ideological Justices pre-
sent a solid front, that very fact may signal to reporters that the deci-
sion is worthy of coverage. There is some "disordered voting" on the
Court, when a more conservative Justice votes for a more liberal out-
come, while a more liberal Justice opts for a more conservative out-
come.3 2  These will produce less homogeneous majority coalitions
and-according to Staudt, Friedman, and Epstein-less press cover-
age. One might expect these decisions to be more legalistic in sig-
nificance (turning on, say, the proper standard for granting summary
judgment) and thus of less interest to newspaper readers. While a
decision on the standards for summary judgment could be extremely
consequential as a practical matter, it may lack the political interest
that motivates news coverage. Hence, it would be premature to con-
clude that ideological homogeneity is the cause of significant deci-
sions, insofar as press coverage is just an indirect proxy for decision
significance, and the proxy may be a biased one.
Another question about the research lies in its operationalization.
The authors' conclusions make much of the fact that the key to opin-
ions is found in the minimum majority. Five votes are all that is
needed to make law, as the authors themselves emphasize. They use
as their independent variable the ideological diversity of the entire
32 For a recent example of "disordered voting," in which Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer voted for a more conservative outcome and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices O'Connor and Thomas voted for a more liberal outcome, see Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1 (2005), which upheld the Controlled Substances Act as a valid exercise of Con-
gress's Commerce Clause authority.
33 See Staudt et al., On the Role of Ideological Homogeneity in Generating Consequential Constitu-
tional Decisions, 10 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 361, 363 (2008) ("[T]he greater the homogeneity of
the majority, the higher the likelihood of a consequential decision.").
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majority coalition, rather than that of the five necessary core votes.
Yet, the ideological homogeneity of the five core Justices seems to be
the more appropriate measure.
Suppose a case is before the Court, and there are five conservative
Justices who wish to issue a dramatic ruling that substantially alters
the law. They, of course, will prefer the company of more moderate
Justices, thereby creating a larger majority behind their opinion.
However, they have little reason to water down the content of their
conservative opinion in order to attract the votes of the more moder-
ate additional Justices. Additional Justices may in fact join the opin-
ion, possibly to avoid the time and effort required to compile their
own concurrence or dissent, but it is not obvious that they have any
real influence on the content of the opinion, as the majority has little
incentive to compromise. 34 The five-Justice core majority will prevail,
regardless of the actions of any of the other Justices. If this scenario
is true, the measure of the homogeneity of the entire coalition will
not capture the appropriate effect; the key to the opinion lies in the
homogeneity of the five core Justices.
The authors control for majority coalition size, so their findings
are essentially that, as among seven-person coalitions, the more ho-
mogeneous the seven, the more likely the decision will be a signifi-
cant one. Yet, for any given seven-person coalition, there would be a
still-more-homogeneous five-person subset of the coalition that could
have produced an even more significant opinion, under the authors'
theory that heterogeneity compromises decisional significance. The
seven-person coalition might be explained by the minimum winning
coalition's willingness to compromise their opinion in order to gain
more votes. But this answer would require a theory of why the addi-
tional votes were so valuable as to warrant a watering down of a five-
person majority opinion. 35 Alternatively, the two might join the five-
person minimum coalition opinion without compromise, in which
case the true measure of homogeneity would be that of the core five,
34 See, e.g., FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE
COLLEGIAL GAME 134 (2000) (finding that "once the majority opinion author achieves a
majority, ajustice's bargaining leverage diminishes drastically").
35 The value of a greater opinion coalition is unclear. Walter F. Murphy suggests that a
smaller majority "may encourage resistance and evasion," while "[t]he greater the major-
ity, the greater the appearance of certainty and the more likely a decision will be accepted
and followed in similar cases." MURPHY, supra note 24, at 66. Recent empirical examina-
tion, though, has called this presumption into question. See THOMAS G. HANSFORI) &
JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 126 (2006)
(finding that the size of a majority coalition is unrelated to whether a decision receives
positive or negative treatment).
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rather than of the full coalition. If so, the authors' measure of ho-
mogeneity contains a built-in bias against larger opinion coalitions.
This effect raises interesting implications. Take an opinion coali-
tion of seven, ranging from the most conservative Justice to a moder-
ately liberal one. If the most cohesive core group of Justices is the
most conservative five, one could expect to see a very different opin-
ion than if the more cohesive core five Justices are clustered around
the median, with the most conservative Justices being relative outliers.
This possible effect should be testable with the authors' data and
could reveal some interesting information. For example, it could
suggest whether more ideological or more moderate core coalitions
produce more significant opinions. Also, it could illuminate the
question of why opinion coalitions are often greater than five mem-
bers, by identifying which Justices are outside the "core" of the deci-
sion's majority coalition.
While it is plausible that ideologically cohesive majority coalitions
write more significant opinions, it is also possible that the findings are
the product of a certiorari-level selection effect. Presumably, the Jus-
tices have a good ex ante idea of their colleagues' preferences. The
certiorari decision is influenced, at least in part, by the Justices' ex-
pectation of case outcome, should the case be taken.3 6 Thus, Justices
who dislike a lower court opinion might vote against certiorari, in
what is known as a "defensive denial," because they fear that the
Court might affirm.37 Conversely, Justices who are more confident
that the Court is aligned with their preferences will engage in "ag-
gressive grants" of certiorari in an attempt to move the law.38
When there is a core of five closely aligned Justices, they should
have more confidence about case outcomes and consequently be
more likely to accept the review of highly significant cases. One
would expect those Justices to engage in more aggressive grants of sa-
lient issues, due to this confidence about the outcome. Staudt,
Friedman, and Epstein account for this effect in their introduction,
where they observe that the Court taking a case in a significant issue
36 See Saul Brenner & John F. Krol, Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United States Supreme
Court, 51J. POL. 828, 829, 839 (1989) (concluding that one of the three strategies Justices
use in deciding whether to grant certiorari is the "prediction strategy," which takes into
account the prospects of a favorable decision on the merits).
37 Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic Decision Makers:
Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57J. POL. 824, 825-26 (1995).
38 Id. at 826.
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area, such as the nature of Miranda rights, does not always yield a sig-
nificant decision.
Yet another variable, not analyzed by the authors, may help ex-
plain the results on opinion salience. The central significance of the
Court's opinion lies in its doctrinal power. This in turn relies on its
implementation in the future, primarily by lower courts. While we
presume that lower courts are largely obedient to Supreme Court de-
cisions,0 they also have ideological preferences that influence their
decisions.4' Lower courts may engage in "shirking," which avoids the
true holding of the Supreme Court. They may frame the facts, so as
to avoid the Court's opinion content, or perhaps find ways to distin-
guish the Court's opinion to limit its power. A rational Supreme
Court would attend to the probability of faithful implementation of
its opinion.
The composition of lower courts should therefore influence the
content of the Court's opinion.3 Suppose that the Supreme Court is
primarily conservative in its ideological attitudes. If the lower courts
are likewise conservative, the Supreme Court should be relatively em-
boldened in its opinions, pronouncing more salient conservative
opinions. However, if the lower courts are relatively liberal, the
Court might adopt a more cautious opinion that would be more
39 See Staudt et al., supra note 33, at 361-62 (discussing how the Burger Court gradually nar-
rowed the scope of Miranda rights, yet ultimately reaffirmed Miranda in Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)).
40 There is ample evidence that the lower courts are largely faithful to Supreme Court
precedents. See generally, e.g., Charles A. Johnson, Research Note, Law, Politics, and Judicial
Decision Making: Lower Federal Court Uses of Supreme Court Decisions, 21 LAW & SOC'Y REv.
325 (1987) (reporting that lower courts followed the holding and reasoning of Supreme
Court opinions); Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., & Lawrence Baum, Supreme Court Authority in the
Judiciary: A Study of Remands, 20 AM. POL. Q. 169 (1992) (finding that most lower courts
reversed their decisions and ruled in favor of the Supreme Court winner on remand).
41 The ideological content of circuit court opinions is well established. See, e.g., CASS R.
SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY (2006) (revealing patterns of ideological circuit voting on different issues);
Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower Court Reac-
tion to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64J. POL. 534, 536 (2002) (finding that signifi-
cant Supreme Court decisions have been influenced by the preferences of the imple-
menting circuit); Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL.
L. REv. 1457, 1482 (2003) ("The weight of the empirical evidence clearly reveals some
role for ideology injudicial decisionmaking.").
42 See Cross, Justices, supra note 27, at 561-65 (discussing how a strategic Supreme Court
would show concern for lower court implementation of its rulings).
43 For a theoretical analysis of this effect, demonstrating that higher court decisions should
depend in part on the composition of lower courts, see generally TonjaJacobi & Emerson
H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political Control, 23J.L. ECON. & ORG. 326, 333-40 (2007).
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faithfully applied in future decisions. An unpublished study suggests
that the Court is in fact influenced by circuit court opinions.
44
Similarly, the Court may be influenced by the preferences of other
institutions, such as Congress. 5 Congress possesses a variety of tools
to punish the judiciary for opinions it considers undesirable, and
there is some evidence that the Supreme Court responds to this con-46
cern. It would be interesting to add variables for contemporary
lower court and congressional preferences to see if they have affected
the Supreme Court's willingness to issue ideologically salient opin-
ions.
Landa and Lax tackle the collegiality question from an entirelydiffeent •47
different perspective. Their Article recognizes that cases present a
series of distinct legal issues for judges to address. At a minimum,
every case presents at least one issue of fact and one of law, and
judges may disagree on either or both. Moreover, the typical case has
multiple factual issues, and each legal issue may have multiple dimen-
sions to be applied to the facts. They analyze how these dimensions
cumulate to produce an outcome, though they do not focus on the
nature of the resulting opinion.
The implication of the multiple dimensions is a recognition that
some measure of collegial agreement is necessary for there to be a
majority opinion. While a majority of'judges might agree on the out-
come, it is unlikely that they would agree precisely on the exact state
of the law or every word written in an opinion. Hence, the judges
joining such an opinion must surely make some compromise of their
preferences.
44 SeeJeffrey A. Berger & Tracey E. George, Judicial Entrepreneurs on the U.S. Courts of Appeals:
A Citation Analysis ofJudicial Influence 2 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working
Paper No. 05-24, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=789544 ("Appeals court
judges can ... influence the Supreme Court and in turn the development of law and pol-
icy." (citation omitted)).
45 See generally, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 11, at 138-45 (discussing howJustices fac-
tor in whether subsequent congressional legislation will merely defy a ruling of the
Court).
46 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Deci-
sionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1437, 1491-92 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court de-
fers strategically to certain institutions in its own decision-making process); Eugenia F.
Toma, A Contractual Model of the Voting Behavior of the Supreme Court: The Role of the Chief
Justice, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 433, 443-44 (1996) (indicating that Supreme Court deci-
sions are affected by congressional financial allocations).
47 Landa and Lax developed a case-space approach to distingush different types ofjudical
disagreement. Dimitri Landa & Jeffry R. Lax, Disagreements on Collegial Courts: A Case-
Space Approach, 10 U. PA.J. CONsT. L. 305 (2008).
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In this approach, some collegiality plays an important role in the
opinion, even when the judges all agree on the outcome. In theory,
each judge might write a separate opinion, setting out his or her
views on both the facts and the law. There is considerable pressure,
however, for the judges to make some compromise on their underly-
ing dimensional preferences, and not to issue seriatim opinions, in
order to create a clearer governing legal standard (and to avoid the
considerable work associated with consistently writing separate opin-
ions). A judge will be better off compromising on some issues in or-
der to join a majority than in refusing to compromise and issuing a
lonesome opinion.
In the conventional, one-dimensional model, it is the median
voter that governs the content of the opinion.4 ' Forjudicial opinions,
this is presumed to be the ideological median judge. However, there
are various reasons to believe that the median voter does not univer-
sally prevail, one of which is addressed by Landa and Lax-the multi-
plicity of dimensions associated with writing a judicial opinion.49 As
the authors note, judges may favor the same outcome in a given case
for very different reasons. If all of the dimensions are monotonic in
the same direction, the median voter might still control, but this is
not necessarily the case. In the ideal, at least, factual disputes would
not have any such ideologically monotonic orientation. Rather than
the outcome being controlled by the median voter, it may be a prod-
uct of unique case circumstances. In addition to case facts, those cir-
cumstances could include the coincidental nature of the legal rules.
One other complicating feature to be considered by the model is
the judiciary's ability to control the dimensions they address in an
opinion. Although the legal issues in a case are defined in the first
instance by the litigants and their briefs, the judiciary is able to alter
or go beyond these choices. This notion has been called "issue fluid-
ity." 50 Appellate judges have some discretion in picking and choosing
48 The median voter theorem is a political science classic that declares that, in democratic
decisions where opinions lie on a single dimension, such as liberal to conservative, the
preference of the median voter will rule the day. See, e.g., Duncan Black, On the Rationale
of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. ECON. 23, 29 (1948) (suggesting that if members of a
committee vote in accordance with their own preferences, the committee's decision will
move towards the median).
49 See Landa & Lax, supra note 47, at 314 (noting that in some models, "policy does not re-
duce to the median voter's ideal rule because of costs and agenda-setting").
50 See Kevin T. McGuire & Barbara Palmer, Issue fluidity on the US. Supreme Court, 89 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 691 app. at 699 (1995) ("Issue fluidity reflects the extent to which the U.S.
Supreme Court, in making decisions on the merits, provides authoritative answers to legal
questions that have not been asked .... ").
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the issues they will address in a given case. This manipulation of is-
sues at the Supreme Court level "occurs quite often."5' The Justices
engage in "issue creation" of questions not presented in the briefs
and "issue suppression," whereby they ignore some of the questions
presented to them.'
Landa and Lax also model judicial preferences on particular di-
mensions as immutable and un-amenable to persuasion, which is con-
trary to the evidence on voting fluidity at the Court and assumes away
the possibility of Edwards/Coffin persuasive collegiality, as well as ig-
noring possible strategic decision making by the Justices . An inter-
esting documented example of the latter fact is found in Craig v.
Boren.54 The case involved the constitutional standard for gender dis-
crimination as one dimension, and Justice Brennan's initial position
argued for a strict scrutiny standard. Unable to cobble together a ma-
jority for this position, though, he moderated his view on this stan-
dard in order to gain a majority for a lowered standard of scrutiny.5"
Although such dimensional fluidity may not be common, it probably
occurs more often as an anticipatory manner; for example, opinion
authors moderate their dimensional preferences with knowledge of
the reaction from otherJustices.
Landa and Lax do not analyze the creation of precedential rules,
but they do scrutinize the application of such precedents, and how
different sorts of rules should yield different results, even when the
deciding judges' preferences are the same. For example, a rule re-
quiring that a plaintiff satisfy standards A and B and C will often yield
different results than a rule simply requiring a plaintiff to satisfy stan-
dards A or B or C. This intuitive finding reveals the importance of
opinions and legal rules, as distinct from mere case outcomes.
The Article assumes a certain level of judicial sincerity that may be
unrealistic. Suppose ajudge, operating under the former rule, wants
to vote for a plaintiff, out of some sense of fairness. Perhaps the
judge honestly does not believe that the plaintiff satisfied standard C.
Such a judge might nevertheless find that standard C was met, in or-
der to rule for the plaintiff. The judge could do this by dishonestly
presenting the facts of the case, to make it appear that standard Cwas
51 Id. at 699.
52 VANESSA A. BAIRD, ANSWERING THE CALL OF THE COURT: HOW JUSTICES AND LITIGANTS
SET THE SUPREME COURT AGENDA 25 (2007).
53 See generally Landa & Lax, supra note 47.
54 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
55 This tale is summarized in EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 11, at 1-13.
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satisfied. Alternatively, the judge might write an opinion that waters
down the requirements of standard C, making it an easier threshold
to satisfy.
Indeed, it is not obvious that Justices attend to the dimensions in
isolation, as the theory propounds. To the extent the Justices are
ideologically oriented to outcomes, they would begin by choosing an
ideologically preferred outcome or party. 56 This result could then be
rationalized via an opinion addressing the separate dimensions, as
projected by the attitudinal model. To the extent that the majority
outcome incorporates significant differences on the underlying di-
mensions, the disagreement may be finessed through issue fluidity
and suppression, or simply by taking an inconclusive approach to an
underlying dimension.
The Landa and Lax theory might also be influenced by lower
court compliance issues or congressional reactions. It presumes that
Supreme Court Justices' opinions on the content of particular issues
in the opinion are driven by the Justices' own sincere preferences,
such as ideological desires. Yet the Justices may be driven to adopt a
contrary position on these issues, out of concern for the effective im-
plementation of their opinion.
The two very different Articles reviewed contribute to the theory
and practice of collegial decision making on multimember courts.
Staudt, Friedman, and Epstein demonstrate how ideology is an im-
portant component of collegial interaction at the Supreme Court,
and how it affects the ultimate product of the Court. Landa and Lax
add the important understanding of multiple legal issue dimensions
in the collegial balance, a factor overlooked by much of the existing
literature.
In an important way, Landa and Lax and Staudt, Friedman, and
Epstein converge on a similar point: to the extent that collegiality is
about consistency and durability of legal policy over time and across
courts, it is unlikely to happen if the court that originates the deci-
sion is ideologically or otherwise fractured on important dimensions
of the broader subject matter at dispute. Landa and Lax illustrate,
theoretically, that a legitimate collegial legal rule may be impossible
when individual judges on a panel disagree about anything more
than the facts of the case. Landa and Lax argue that the most fun-
56 This corresponds to the Supreme Court's practice, which begins with a preliminary vote
on the merits taken at conference, before any of the underlying dimensions are analyzed.
Of course, it is possible that the role of the dimensions has already been analyzed at the
time of this vote.
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damental features of legitimate legal rules-predictability, stability,
consistency, and non-arbitrariness-may not exist at the collegial
level when judges have differences over such things as the relevance
of various case dimensions or thresholds for application of rules in
those dimensions. This is so even when they come to an agreement
on the individual case outcome. The process of aggregating the
preferences of individual judges over various policy dimensions, legal
dimensions, and thresholds within those dimensions inevitably leads
to an unstable statement of legal policy. Staudt, Friedman, and Ep-
stein illustrate a similar result empirically. They find that court ma-
jorities that have few differences across legal and policy goals-that is,
an ideologically homogeneous court-can produce a more "conse-
quential" decision, essentially a decision that produces a consistent
legal analysis that will have greater longevity and legitimacy, than can
a court that is more heterogeneous on legal and policy goals.
Neither Article truly comes to grips with the more conventional
"warm and fuzzy" Edwards/Coffin concept of collegiality. This is en-
tirely understandable, if only because this Edwards/Coffin concept is
much more difficult to measure or model. Perhaps this collegial
concept does not indeed apply in practice, and judges may be single-
minded seekers of their preexisting preferences (whether ideological
or legal). Although there are some clear examples of the collegial
practice, its use may not be common, and the evidence of ideological
voting at the Supreme Court calls the concept into some question at
that level of the judicial hierarchy. Still, we do not really know much
about this practice, and the dispute illustrates a shortcoming of social
science research practices, which focus on that which is more readily
measurable, and may overlook features less amenable to measure us-
ing social scientific methods.
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